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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and 
MERLE HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. 
BIGELOW and NORMA G. 
BIGELOW, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 17754 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BIGELOW 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants brought this ac~~on to quiet 
title in them to.certain properties also claimed by the 
defendants-respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the Court. The Court quieted 
title in plaintiffs-appellants to the parcel shown as W-X-Y-
z on Appendix A, quieted title in defendants-respondents 
Bigelow to the property colored brown on Appendix A, and 
quieted title in defendants-respondents Cluff and Bigelow to 
the parcel designated P-M-N-0 on Appendix A. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents Bigelow seek to have the de-
cision of the trial Court affirmed in all respects. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As long as anyone presently alive can remember, there 
has been a fence running along the lines shown in red on 
Appendix A, and designated by the letters Y-X-P-M, M-N, and 
N-0 and its continuation. (R. 300, see also 160-61, 216, 
259.) For the same period of time, the property enclosed on 
three sides by the fence has been occupied and used by the 
respondents and their predecessors in interest, and, with 
the exception of some recent verbal assertions of ownership 
(R. 175-76, 177-78, 277-79), the appellants and their predeces-
sors in interest who have occupied the lands outside the 
fence have not occupied, used, or attempted to_ use any of 
the lands within the fence. (R. 167-68, 221-23, 264, 268, 
269-70, 271-73, 277.) 
The Bigelows purchased their property (Lot 2 on the 
attached Appendix A) from the Jewetts on June 18, 1947. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2; R. 263.) From all visual appear-
ances the property extended from the road in front (south) 
of the property to the fence in the back (north). The 
Jewetts, Bigelows' predecessors in interest, had occupied 
back to the fence •. (R. 264.) The ·Bigelows also occupied 
the property back to the fence. The evidence presented at 
trial showed that the Bigelows raised turkeys in a shed in 
the northeast corner of the property next to the fence. 
(R. 265.) They built a chicken coop in the northwest corner 
2 
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of their property next to the fence. (R. 265.) They cul-
tivated a garden in this northern area of what they believed 
to be their property, and also harvested fruit from trees 
growing there. (R. 266-67, 274.) The Bigelows acted under 
the impression that they had purchased the property back to 
the fence (R. 264, 272); however, the property actually 
delineated by the legal description on their warranty deed 
is offset approximately 50 feet south of the property occupied 
on the ground, giving the Bigelows record title to the road-
way but no record title to the north end of the property 
they occupied. (R. 129, 136, 141.) The Bigelows paid the 
taxes which were assessed on their property each year since 
they purchased it. (R. 281; defendants' Exhibit No. 25.) 
The Cluff and Bigelow properties were not the only ones 
offset south of occupancy. In 1924 John Clift, who at the 
time owned all the property shown on Appendix A, deeded to 
Athol Blake and James Fisher, respectively, properties 
somewhat analogous to the present Parcels 6 and 7 (R. 334-
35). The present Parcels 6 and 7 have Center Street as 
their north boundary. However, the parcels conveyed to 
Fisher and Blake were located 50 feet south_of Center Street, 
and included parts of Parcel 4, the area in dispute (R. 334-
35). The approximately 50 foot offset was corrected later 
that same year by Clift deeding to Fisher and Blake the 50 
foot parcels between their properties and Center Street, in 
3 
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exchange for them deeding back to Clift the south 50 feet of 
their properties, including much of what is now the disputed 
Parcel 4 (R. 335-36, see also R. 337, 341). 
The Clifts did not pay the taxes for 1946 through 1950 
on those parcels received back from Fisher and Blake (R. 
337), and the property was therefore sold at a tax sale. 
However, for some unexplained reason the property purportedly 
conveyed by the tax sale was slightly larger than those 
properties Clift had received from Fisher and Blake and upon 
which he had failed to pay the taxes (R. 340-41). 
The property conveyed by the tax deed was the parcel 
designated as A-B-C-D on Appendix A, which measures 75 feet 
by 181.5 feet and contains approximately .31 acres [the deed 
shows an area of .21 acres, but this is apparently in error] 
{defendants' Exhibit No. 27, plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 29). 
This property was conveyed to Mayor George Collard upon his 
payment of $26.34 to the County {id.). 
The record does not disclose why Mayor Collard purchased 
the ~~B-C-D parcel of land at the tax sale~ it does clearly 
show, however, that he never occupied it (R. 167, 228). 
Mayor Collard apparently made no attempts to assert ownership, 
for it wasn't until later, after Albert Halladay (plaintiff's 
father and predecessor in interest) affirmatively investigated, 
that the Halladays knew of Mayor Collard's record title to 
the parcel in question (R. 167). In July, 1958, the plaintiff 
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Mack Halladay and his father, Albert Halladay, obtained a 
quit claim deed to the A-B-C-D parcel of land from Mayor 
Collard for an undisclosed sum of money, and in November of 
that same year Albert Halladay quit claimed his interest in 
the parcel to his son (plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 29). 
The appellants and their predecessors in interest were 
already in possession of over half of the A-B-C-D parcel 
when they purchased whatever interest Mayor Collard had in 
it. Slightly less than half of the parcel, the area desig-
nated by the letters M-N-0-P on Appendix A, was occupied by 
respondents. About one year prior to acquiring record title 
to the M-N-0-P parcel, Mack Halladay told Perry Bigelow that 
he had purchased a parcel of property in Bigelows' back yard 
(R. 277, Appellants' Brief at 8). Mack Halladay made no 
further assertions ~f ownership until th~ 1970's, when he 
periodically told Perry Bigelow that he claimed the property 
( R. 278). The tr_ial court specifically found that: 
The only evidence of plaintiffs' asserting a 
claim of ownership and title to the tract in 
dispute~ cross-hatched in orange, points M-N-
0-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 was an incident 
occuring in 1977 or 1978 when plaintiffs' 
[sic] asserted title thereto as against 
defendant Bigelow and ordered Bigelow to 
cease digging a potato cellar thereon. 
Defendant Bigelow moved his digging within 
the ground to which he held legal title, but 
testified that he did not acknowledge plain-
tiffs' superior right to the land is [sic] 
dispute. 
(R. 54). In 1979 the plaintiff attempted to install a fence 
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across the back of Bigelows' property, which fence Bigelow 
removed (R. 278-279), and this action was commenced soon 
thereafter (R. 4-7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS 
APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE TAX SALE OF PROPERTY ON 
BOTH SIDES OF THE BOUNDARY. 
The occupancy of the lands involved in this lawsuit is 
not in dispute. Bigelows and Cluffs occupied the land south 
of the M-N fenceline since 1947 and 1948; during the same 
period the Halladays and his parents occupied the land north 
of the fence. There was substantial evidence ·that the 
Halladays did not seriously dispute Bigelows' claim to the 
disputed area south of the fence until 1977 or 1978 (R. 54). 
However, for the brief period from 1951 to 1958, a third 
person held record title to land on both sides of the M-N 
· fenceline, although the evidence indicated that he never in 
any way attempted to occupy or possess the land. The only 
substantial question presented by this appeal is what effect, 
if any, did this third person's unasserted record interest 
have on the rights to the parties to this lawsuit. 
"The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives from [the] 
realization, ancient in our law, that the peace and good 
order of society is best served by leaving at rest possible 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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disputes over long established boundaries." Baum v. Defa, 
525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974). The doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence evolved from the doctrine of adverse possession. 
Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009, 1012 (1906). This 
Court has established four elements which must be shown to 
establish a boundary by acquiescence: 
(1) occupation up to a visible line marked 
definitely by monuments, fences or buildings 
and (2) acquiescence in the line as the 
boundary (3) for a long period of years (4) 
by adjoining landowners. 
Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 ·P.2d 143, 145 (1964). 
Point I of appellants' Brief contends that the last 
element, that the parties be adjoining landowners, was not 
satisfied. 
Case law exploring the purposes and limits of the 
requirement that the parties be adjoining landowners is at 
least scarce and probably nonexistent. The evident purpose 
of the requirement is to state the obvious rule that the 
only acquiescence that is material to a boundary dispute is 
the acquiescence of those who live next to the boundary. The 
requirement is akin to that of standing: only those whose 
rights would be affected by the location of a boundary in a 
certain place have "standing" to acquiesce in the location 
of that boundary. 
This apparent requirement of "standing" is clearly 
satisfied in the instant case. Each of the parties to this 
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lawsuit have a very definite interest in the location of the 
boundaries between their properties, and they are the only 
ones that have such an interest. In all respects, this is 
the type of dispute that the doctrine of boundary by acqui-
escence was developed to resolve. The fact that at one time 
a third person held record title to land on both sides of 
the disputed boundary should not be allowed to obscure the 
fact that the parties to· this lawsuit and their predecessors 
in interest have acquiesced in the fenceline as the boundary 
between their respective occupancies for a period well in 
excess of fifty years. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
should be held to apply to the instant case. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL CLEARLY ESTABLISHED 
EACH OF THE ELEMENTS OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
A. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial 
court's findings or there was a misapplicatlon of the law. 
The decisions of this Court clearly establish that 
although the appellant's burden on appeal of a suit in 
equity is somewhat less than for an action at law, that 
burden is nonetheless very substantial, both as to findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant must make a 
very clear showing of error in order to justify reversing 
the decree of the trial court. The trial judge is given a 
considerable latitude of discretion in determining whether 
8 
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equity and good conscience require that relief be granted. 
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979). There is a 
strong presumption that the decision of the trial court is 
correct and supported by the evidence: 
[I]t has long been established and reiterated 
by this court in numerous cases that due to 
the advantaged position of the trial court we 
will review its findings and judgments with 
considerable indulgence, and will not disagree 
with and upset them unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against them, or the 
court has mistaken or misapplied the law 
applicable thereto. 
Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975); followed in 
Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54 (Utah 1980). 
In order to establish their claim of boundary by acqui~ 
escence the respondents were required to prove the existance 
of four elements: 
( 1) occu·pa tion up to a visible line marked 
definitely by monuments, fences or buildings 
and (2) acquiescence in the line as the 
boundary (3) for a long period of years (4) 
by adjoining land owners. 
Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143, 145 (1964). 
The trial court concluded that each of these elements had 
been established. As demonstrated below, the evidence does 
not clearly preponderate against the findings of the trial 
court upon which its conclusion was based; on the contrary, 
there is substantial evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings. Likewise, the trial court was not mistaken in its 
understanding of or application of the law applicable to 
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each of the above mentioned elements. The decision of the 
trial court should therefore be affirmed. 
Attached hereto for the convenience of the Court are 
the following: 
Appendix A - Map of the properties. 
Appendix B - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Appendix C - Decree. 
B. The evidence clearly established occupation up to a 
visible line marked ~efinitely by monuments, fences or build-
ings. 
This element is not in dispute. Appellants' Brief at 
6. For a period of time well in excess of 20 y~ars the 
respondents have used, occupied ·and treated as their own the 
land up to (south of) the M-N fence. The fence is definitely 
marked, clearly visible, and has been in existence for more 
than 50 years. 
c. The evidence established acquiescence in the fence 
as the boundary between the properties of the respondents 
and the appellants. 
The trial court concluded that the appellants (Halladay) 
had acquiesced in the M-N fence as the boundary between 
their property and that of the respondents (Cluff and Bigelow). 
This conclusion was based on findings that the P-M-N-0 
fenceline has marked the boundary of occupancy of the respon-
dents since before 1948 and that the respondents and their 
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predecessors "have built improvements upon the land, [and] 
have occupied it for the purpose of farming, storage and 
business operat1"ons." {R 54 ) The co t f th f d . . . ur ur er oun 
that the appellants "have never occupied" the disputed area 
south of the fence, and that: 
The only evidence of plaintiffs' asserting a 
claim of ownership and title to the tract in 
dispute, cross-hatched in orange, points M-N-
0-P on [Appendix A] was an incident occuring 
in 1977 or 1978 when plaintiffs' [sic] 
asserted title thereto as against defendant 
Bigelow and ordered Bigelow to cease digging 
a potato cellar thereon. Defendant Bigelow 
moved his digging within the ground to which 
he held legal title, but testified that he 
did not acknowledge p1aintiffs' superior 
right to the land is [sic] dispute •. 
Appellants advanced two arguments in opposition to the 
trial court's findings: (1) The appellants' purchase of 
land south of the fence is antithetical to.acquiescence in 
the fence as a boundary, and (2) the appellants have periodi-
cally claimed ownership to the disputed parcel, and the 
respondents' use thereof was therefore with the appellants' 
permission. These arguments will be treated in their re-
spective order. 
The appellants contend that: 
Although plaintiffs may have allowed defen-
dants to occupy portions of Parcel P-M-N-0, 
plaintiffs did not purchase an entire parcel 
of ground simply to give it away to adjoining 
landowners. Purchasing real estate is not 
acquiescence that a third party may have it. 
Plaintiffs' purchase of Parcel P-M-N-0 is 
antithetical to their acquiescence in the M-N 
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fence as a boundary between plaintiffs' 
property and defendants' property. 
Appellants' Brief at 5-6. 
The above statement is based on the fact that in 1958 
the appellants purchased from Mayor Collard a parcel of 
ground. Insofar as the above quotation implies that all the 
appellants' purchased was the P-M-N-0 parcel, the statement 
is clearly wrong. The land encompassed by the deed from 
Collard to the appellants is designated as A-B-C-D on Appen-
dix A, and comprises an area of 13,612.5 square feet. The 
disputed P-M-N-0 parcel, comprising approximately 6,271.6 
square feet, is less than half of the total area the appell-
ants purchased from Collard. Appellants' contention· that, 
since they already had colorable title to more than half of 
the A-B-C-D parcel, all they really purchased was the P-M-N-
0 parcel is simply not established by the evidence. It is 
one inference that could be drawn from the evidence, but it 
is only that. An equally, if not more, plausible inference 
is that the appellants were simply trying to remove a cloud 
on their title.. In support of this latter inference is the 
evidence that Mayor Collard apparently paid only $26.34 for 
the A-B-C-D parcel, and apparently had no intentions of 
taking possession of the parcel. It wasn't until some time 
after Collard acquired record title that the appellants were 
even aware of Collard's claim to the property, and that was 
only after the appellants' affirmative investigation (R. 
167). When the appellants discovered the cloud on their title 
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they purchased Collard's interest. 
The inference that the appellants were simply removing a 
cloud on their own title is further supported by the evidence, 
more fully discussed in.the next section, that, with the ex-
ception of occasional unsupported verbal assertions, the 
appellants made no effort to take possession of the P-M-N-0 
parcel until approximately 20 years after they supposedly 
acquired title to it. This failure to assert their interest ir 
the M-N-0-P parcel was rational only if their intent in buying 
the A-B-C-D parcel was merely to· remove a cloud on their title4 
However, if the focus of their purchase was really the M-N-0-P 
parcel, their failure for over 20 years to physically assert 
possession was so irrational as to belie their stated intent. 
The trial court concluded that the appellants' purchase o: 
the A-B-C-D parcel ·did not vitiate their acquiescence in the M· 
fenceline as a boundary. The evidence does not preponderate 
against that finding, and the court was not under a misappre-
hension of the law. The decision should be affirmed. 
As a second argument in opposition to the trial court's 
conclusion that the appellants acquiesced in the M-N fence lin 
as a boundary, the appellants assert that: 
There is no testimony that any question about 
a boundary line arose prior to 1978. Mr. 
Halladay has always claimed the P-M-N-0 
property even though he allowed defendants to 
use it. 
13 
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[P]laintiffs have on many occasions claimed 
ownership of the P-M-N-0 parcel during the 
period of plaintiffs' alleged acquiescence in 
the M-N fence as a boundary line. · 
Appellants' Brief at 9, 10. 
The incidents referred to by the appellants are that 
Mack Halladay told Perry Bigelow some time between 1957 and 
1960 that Halladay had purchased a piece of ground in Bigelows' 
back yard, and that again off and on during the last ten 
years Halladay again claimed ownership to the disputed 
parcel, but never took any action to occupy or use the 
property (R. 277-78). That such passive verbal assertions 
unsupported by any form of physical act are not sufficient 
to vitiate acquiescence was clearly established by this 
~--
Court in Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 
(1973). The appellants in that case likewise asserted that 
they did not "interid" the fence to be a boundary. The court 
responded: 
To this we say that the test to establish the 
boundary by "acquiescence" necessarily need 
not be based on mutual "intent." "Intent" is 
not synonymous with "acquiescence" in these 
cases·. "Acquiescence" is more nearly synony-
mous with "indolence," or "c.onsent by silence," 
--or a knowledge that a fence or other monu-
ments appears to be a boundary,--but that no 
one did anything about it for 48 years. No 
one in this case did much except by invective, 
across the very fence that made irritants out 
of erstwhile neighbors, for 48 years,--until 
suddenly the appreciation of property values 
transmuted yesteryear's minimal values into 
objects d'art of inestimable value in the 
real estate market. 
14 
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The trial Court concluded that the appellant's occas-
ional invectives across the fence did not counteract his 
physical acquiescence. The evidence does not preponderate 
against that finding and conclusion, and the trial court was 
not under a misapprehension of the law. The decision should 
therefore be affirmed. 
D. The evidence established that the appellants' 
acquiescence was for a long period of years. 
As established above, there was substantial evidence 
presented at trial that the appellants acquiesced in the 
fence as the boundary for over 20 years. 
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the acquiescence 
··-
only extended over a period of ·12 years (appellants' Brief 
at 11-12), that should not defeat respondents' claim of 
boundary by acquiescence. Although a period ·of 20 years is 
generally required, this Court has clearly stated "that 
there is no exact time requirement; and that it may depen~ 
upon the circumstances of the particular case." Hobson v. 
Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 795 (Utah 1975); see also 
Boyer v. Noirot, 97 Ill. App. 3d 636, 423 N.E.2d 274 (1981). 
Under the unusual circumstances of this case, a lesser 
period should be deemed sufficient. The fence has been 
treated as a boundary between the properties for over 50 
years. The only possible interruption of that acquiescence 
is the result of a tax deed whose original owner (Collard) 
15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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was never seen on the property in question, and whose sub-
sequent purchaser {the appellants} did nothing more than 
utter invectives across the fence to assert their owner-
ship to the lesser portion of the property covered by the 
tax deed. 
E. The evidence established that the acquiescence in 
the fence as a boundary was by adjoining landowners. 
As established in Point I of this brief, to treat the 
parties to this action as adjoining landowners would satisfy 
the purposes of this element of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. Each of the elements of that doctrine having 
been satisfied, the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE DOES 
NOT REQUIRE THAT THERE BE AN EXPLICIT AGREEMENT 
OR DISPUTE AS TO THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 
RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES. 
Although some earlier cases may have appeared to re-
quire that the parties acquiesce or agree on a boundary 
between their properties after a dispute as to the location 
of that boundary, that requirement was plainly put to rest 
in Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792 {Utah 1975); 
see also Note, ~oundaries by Agreement and Acquiescence in 
Utah, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 221. In that case the court stated 
that the purpose of the doctrine was not to give effect to 
the resolution of dispute, but rather to prevent disputes: 
16 
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The very reason for being of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence or agreement is that 
in the interest of preserving the peace and 
good order of society the quietly resting 
bones of the past, which no one seems to have 
been troubled or complained about for a long 
period of years, should not be unearthed for 
the purpose of stirring up controversy, but 
should be left in their repos~. 
530 P.2d at 794. 
CONCLUSION 
For a long period of years, at least 20, and probably 
more than 50, the appellants and their predecessors in 
interest have occupied the land north of the M-N fence, and 
have acquiesced in the fact that the respondents and their 
predecessors in interest have occupied the land south of the 
.. 
fence. The trial court concluded that that fence should be 
established as the boundary between the properties of the 
parties to this lawsuit. The evidence does not clearly 
preponderate against the findings of the trial Court, and 
the trial Court was not under a misapprehension as to the 
law applicable thereto. The decision of the trial Court 
should therefore be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this 19th day of February, 1982. 
Respectfully sUf?ni5Jed, 
'"> , /' 
/ \_ ~ -
i='Rt}~i ~fo;:l_JJ 
, HOW-ARD,rLEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
· Bigelows 
17 
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MAILED two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents 
to Brent D. Young, Ivie and Young, Attorneys for Appellants, 
P. O. Box 672, Provo, Utah 84603 and to M. Dayle Jeffs, 
Jeffs & Jeffs, Attorneys for Respondents Cluff, P. O. Box 
683, Provo, Utah 84603, this 19th day of February, 1982. 
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2 
M. DAYLE JEFFS OF JEFFS AND JEFFS 
3 Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
4 P. 0. Box 683 
Provo, Utah 84601 
5 Telephone: 373-8848 
6 IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
7 STATE OF UTAH 
8 MACK HALLADAY and 
MERLE HALLADAY, 
9 
10 
11 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIOl~S OF LAW 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. 
12 BIGELOW and NORMA G. 
Civil No. 53,243 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
'18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
90 NORTH 100 EAST 
P.O. BOX 113 
PROVO. UTAH 84601 
(801) 373-8848 
BIGELOW, 
Defendants. 
This watter came before the Court for trial on the 
28th day of August, 1980, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for 
the plaintiffs, tl. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant 
Cluff, and S. Rex Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants 
Bigelow. The parties presented their evidence and after 
having presented final arguments to the Court on the facts 
and the law the Court took the matter under advisement. On 
December 3, 1980, plaintiff brought a Motion to Reopen for 
the purpose of offering additional evidence as to plaintiffs' 
claim of title. The Court granted the Motion to Reopen and 
received the additional· evidence and having fully considered 
the same, now makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs and plaintiffs predecessors 
in interest have occupied up to the visible boundary fenceline 
in parcel 3 shown on Exhibit #12 and cross-hatched in green, 
52 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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1 
2 lying within the title of the defendant, Madge Kelson Cluff, 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
for many years, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 606.35 feet West and 319.36 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West 
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah 
10.36 feet; thence North 1°00' East 174.10 feet; tnence 
South 89°00 1 East 7.49 feet; thence South 0°03'17" West 
along a fence line 174.12 feet to the point of beginning. 
Area= 0.04 acres 
2. The parties hereto have acquiesced in said 
10 line as a boundary line for a long period of years as adjoining 
11 land owners. 
12 3. The court finds that defendants Bigelow and 
13 their predecessors in interest have occupied that strip of 
14 land within the legal title of plaintiffs Halladay on Exhibit 
15 #12 in parcel 1, which is cross-hatched in brown. The parties 
16 hereto have acquiesced in said line as a boundary for a long 
17 period of years by the adjoining land owners. Said parcel is 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 488.57 feet West and 317.30 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West 
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah 
7.29 feet; thence North 1° 00' East 177.60 feet; thence 
East 4.67 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West alonq a fence 
line 177.70 feet to the point of beginning. Area= 0.02 Acres. 
4. As to the property in controversy between 
26 the plaintiffs and defendants Cluff and Bigelow shown on 
27 Exhibit #12, cross-hatched in orange and marked by points 
28 M-N-0-P, the court finds that: 
29 (a) The plaintiffs succeeded to a tax 
30 title to the description outlined in yellow on Exhibit #12 
31 and marked by points A-B-C-D. Tax title was issued to George 
32 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
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P.O. BOX 118 
PROVO. UTAH 84601 
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1 
2 E. Collard by Utah County on the 23rd day of May, 1951 and 
3 recorded June 28, 1951 in the off ice of the Utah County Recorder. 
4 This document is defendant's Exhibit #27. 
5 
6 
(b) The tax deed is regular on its face. 
(c) The plaintiffs have never occupied 
7 the area cross-hatched in orange on Exhibits #8 and #12, nor 
8 the area within the fencelines identified on Exhibits #8 and 
9 #12 as points P-M-N-0. 
10 (d) The fence between points P-M-N-0 have 
11 existed for many years. 
12 5. The fenceline marked P-M-N-0 has marked 
13 the boundary of occupancy of the defendants Cluff and Bigelow 
14 and their predecessors in interest since before 1948. 
15 6. The defendants Cluffs and Bigelow and 
16 their predecessors have built improvements upon the land, 
17 have occupied it for purpose of farming, storage and business 
18 operations. 
19 7. The fenceline M-N has been in existence 
20 for over 50 years according to the testimony of plaintiffs' 
21 witnesses. 
22 8. The only evidence of plaintiffs' asserting a 
23 claim of ownership and title to the tract in dispute, cross-
24 hatched in orange, points H-N-0-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 was 
25 an incident occurring in 1977 or 1978 when plaintiffs' 
26 asserted title thereto as against defendant Bigelow and 
27 ordered Bigelow to cease digging a potato cellar thereon. 
28 Defendant Bigelow moved his digging within the ground to 
29 which he held legal title, but testified that he did not 
30 acknowledge plaintiffs' superior right to the land is dis-
31 pute. 
32 
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II 
II 
1 
2 9. The court visited the premises and in 
3 viewing the north boundary of the land in dispute, point 
4 M-N on Exhibits 8 and 12, observed that there was a well 
5 developed fenceline and a planted area marking that as the 
6 area of occupancy as between the plaintiffs' property on 
7 the north and defendant's property on the south. The 
8 possession of the disputed ground was in the defendants 
9 as of the date of viewing as was shown by the witnesses 
10 called and the documentary evidence, including photographs, 
11 that were submitted to the court. 
12 10. Thero is no record title in either of 
13 the defendants to the property in dispute. The defendants 
14 legal title to their north boundaries is along a fence 
15 approximately from point P to point 0 on Exhibits 8 and 12. 
16 11. The acquisition of title by plaintiffs' 
17 through the tax deed to George Collard of May, 1951 includes 
18 a 20 foot strip within Halladays chain of title to parcels 
19 6 and 7. 
20 12. Plaintiffs' chain of title to parcels 6 
21 and 7 and the area north of points M to N on Exhibits 8 and 
22 12 was not based on the tax sale. 
23 Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
24 Court now makes and enters its: 
25 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
26 l. The court concludes that neither the tax 
27 title limitation statutes nor the succeeding to legal title 
28 by tax deed cut off the defendants claims to title by 
29 acquiescence to the property within the fences described 
30 as M~N-0-P on Exhibits 8 and 12. 
31 
32 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
90 NORTH 100 EAST 
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2. The plaintiffs have established the 
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1 
2 elements for boundary by acquiescence as to the.cross-hatched 
3 green area in parcel 3 on Exhibit 12 by establishing: 
4 (a) Occupation by defendants and their 
5 predecessors in interest up to a visible line marked definitely 
6 by fences and other visible monuments. 
7 
8 boundary. 
9 
10 
11 
(b) Acquiescence in the line as to the 
(c) For a long period of years. 
(d) By adjoining land owners. 
3. The defendants Bigelow have established 
12 the elements of a boundary by acquiescence as to the cross-
13 hatched area in brown on Exhibit 12 in parcel 1 by the same 
14 standards set forth in paragraph 2 above. 
15 4. The defendants have established title by 
16 acquiescence to the property within the fences described as 
17 points M-N-0-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 by the same standards set 
18 forth in paragraph 2 above. 
19 5. The court concludes that as to each of 
20 the above matters, the respective parties have established 
21 their title by acquiescence pursuant to the rulings in 
22 Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1964); 
23 Hales vs. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (1979); and Brown vs. Peterson, 
24 Supreme Court No. 16785 decided December 18, 1980. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
90 NORTH 100 EAST 
P.O. BOX 183 
PROVO. UTAH 8460 I 
(801) 373-8848 
Dated and signed this :k!]_ day of JULY 1981. 
BY THE COURT: 
-s-
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
10 NORTH 100 EAST 
P.O. IOX IU 
PROVO, UTAH 84801 
(801) 373·8848 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings and 
Conclusions was mailed to the following attorneys this 23rd 
day of July, 1981 by placing same ·in the United States mails, 
addressed as follows: 
Brent D. Young, Esquire 
Ivie & Young 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
s. Rex Lewis, Esquire 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Defendants Bigelow 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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1 
2 
M. DAYLE JEFFS OF JEFFS AND JEFFS 
3 Attorneys for Defendant Cluff 
90 North 100 East 
4 P. O. Box 683 
Provo, Utah 84601 
5 Telephone: 373-8848 
6 IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
7 STATE OF UTAH 
8 MACK HALLADAY and 
MERLE HALLADAY, 
9 
10 
11 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, DECREE 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. 
12 BIGELOW and NORMA G. Civil No. 53,243 
13 
14 
15 
16 
l7 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
JEFFS ANO JEFFS 
A'l"fORNEYB AT LAW 
BIGELOW, 
Defendants. 
·1 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 
28th day of August, 1980, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for 
the plaintiffs, M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant 
Cluff, and S. Rex Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants 
Bigelow. The parties presented their evidence and after 
having presented final arguments to the Court on the facts 
and the law the court took the matter under advisement. On 
December 3, 1930, plaintiff brought a motion to reopen for 
the purpose.of offering additional evidence as to plaintiffs' 
claim of title. The court granted the motion to reopen and 
received the additional evidence and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters 
the following: 
D E C R E E 
1. Plaintiffs are granted a decree quieting 
title to themselve$ to the following described property: 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
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9 
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JEFFS ANO JEFFS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
90 NORTH 1 0 0 EAST 
P.O. IOX Ill 
PROVO. UTAH 8460 I 
(IOI) 173°8848 
Commencing 606.35 feet West and 319.36 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West 
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah 
10.36 feet; thence North 1°00' East 174.10 feet; thence 
South 89°00' East 7.49 feet; thence South 0°03'17" West 
along a fence line 174.12 feet to the point of beginning. 
Area = 0.04 acres 
2. Defendants Bigelow are granted a decree 
quieting title to themselves in the area described as follows: 
Commencing 488.57 feet West and 317.30 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West 
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah 
7.29 feet; thence North 1°00' East 177.60 feet; thence 
East 4.67 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West along a fence 
line 177. 70 feet to the point of beginning. Area= 0. 02 Acres 
3. Defendants Cluff and Bigelow are granted 
a decree quieting title in that portion of tract #4 on Exhibits 
8 and 12 cross-hatched in orange, more particularly described 
as follows: 
Commencing 588.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 118.10 
feet; thence North 0°03'17" East along a fence line 55.31 
feet; thence South 89°51'20" East along a fence line 
118.20 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West along a fence 
line 55.01 feet to the point of beginning. Area 0.15 Acres 
Dated and signed this ..:l!1.- day of July, 1981. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Decree 
was mailed to the following attorneys this 23rd day of July, 
1981 by placing same in the United States mails, addressed 
as follows: 
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JEFFS AND JEFFS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
10 NORTH 100 EAST 
I 
Brent D. Young, Esquire 
Ivie & Young 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
s. Rex Lewis, Esquire 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Defendants Bigelow 
P. O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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